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LARRY YACKLE∗

Before I looked into the two fine books we are reviewing here,1 I would
have said that arguments from federalism are typically fraudulent, neither more
nor less than deliberate attempts to cloud the discussion of real issues. Now
that I have read what Sotirios A. Barber and Michael S. Greve have written, I
am largely confirmed in my prejudices. But my suspicions about federalism
contentions have been shaken a bit – enough to ask some questions of
Professor Greve, whose answers might persuade me that there is some good in
this federalism business, after all. I doubt it, but I am educable.
I begin by explaining my low opinion of federalism theories. None of this is
original with me, of course. I offer it only to establish the burden of persuasion
that, in my view, Professor Greve must carry. Next, I sketch what I take to be
Greve’s argument for a “competitive” federalism. Then I put five questions
about his book. I do not mean these questions to be antagonistic, though I
confess they may sound that way. The point is to seek clarification – to get at
what Greve is getting at.
I.
The suspicion that federalism arguments are duplicitous is familiar enough.
When your adversary’s case begins to look attractive and your own
comparatively weak, you naturally change the subject. We need not rest on the
classic example, the South’s resistance to racial equality in the name of “states’
rights.” Current illustrations are not far to seek. Officials in Texas claim an
offense to state sovereignty if the Justice Department dares to challenge state
redistricting plans,2 and, as Professor Barber observes, critics of the Affordable
Care Act have adopted the same position.3 Acknowledging that federalism talk
can mask independent values is neither ad hominem nor cynical. We ought to
be skeptical when the objection to a principle or policy is not that it is wrong in
substance but that it is recognized or implemented at the wrong stratum of
∗

Professor of Law and Basil Yanakakis Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University. I
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1 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS (2013); MICHAEL S. GREVE,
THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012).
2 Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Suing in Texas Cases over Voting by Minorities, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2013, at A12.
3 See BARBER, supra note 1, at 1.
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government. If there is something worthwhile in federalism itself, it has to be
detached from other ideas for which it is so often a proxy.
There is another layer to the federalism-as-fraud point. When switching the
conversation to “states’ rights” is insufficient, the next tactic is to deploy
federalism as code for individual liberty.4 For reasons that passeth
understanding, some people respond favorably to the states’ rights trope alone.
Yet most would not bestir themselves greatly to preserve some sense of what
the states do or are entitled to do in spite of a national consensus to the
contrary. Comparatively speaking, threats to liberty get the juices flowing. One
might think that tying federalism to liberty would be a stretch. Then again, it
seems that willing minds in this country will view anything that hobbles
government as a good thing inasmuch as, by hypothesis, somebody’s
individual freedom is enhanced.5
Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin have famously explained that
federalism makes practical sense elsewhere in the world, where this peculiar
governmental structure is necessary to maintain a single nation, many of whose
citizens find their political identity in religion or language, which, in turn, takes
root in particular geographic regions.6 When distinct congregate populations so
hate each other, and so resist being governed together by the same central
authority, the only way forward is spatial subunits with some measure of
autonomy.7 Federalism is not an affirmatively desirable governmental
structure, but a “painful expedient” when a nation can be viable in no other
way.8
Feeley and Rubin demonstrate that these conditions for federalism do not
obtain in this country. True, there was a time when some Americans were
willing to fight and die to keep other Americans in chains. But we had a Civil
War about that, and, today, notwithstanding its celebrated diversities on so
many levels, the United States “is in fact a heavily homogenized culture with

4

E.g., Clarence Thomas, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, Why Federalism Matters,
Remarks at Drake University Law School’s Dwight D. Opperman Lecture (Sept. 24, 1999),
in 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 236 (2000) (contending that the independent sovereignty of the
states allows them to protect liberty by restraining the national government); see Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
5 Professor Moncrieff has identified a cousin of this phenomenon in the complaint that
the Affordable Care Act requires individuals to purchase health insurance. In that instance,
critics of the statute have judged that voters will not be moved sufficiently by the
federalism-as-liberty connection and must be encouraged to see a threat to liberty in
isolation. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the
Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. 639, 640
(2012).
6 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 68 (2008).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 60.
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high levels of normative consensus.”9 Federalism retains some romantic
purchase on our politics – which accounts for the value of injecting federalism
arguments into debates over policy. But the virtues commonly associated with
geographically defined, partially autonomous subdivisions amount to so many
rationalizations; they could more easily be realized through sensible
decentralization.10 The vices that inevitably accompany federalism need hardly
be listed. We lack other nations’ reasons for living with them, and so we
should not. If, then, this unified nation is rapidly developing a centralized
structure (and it is), we should welcome the future as it takes shape around us.
II.
Professor Greve acknowledges the case that Feeley and Rubin offer and
responds that the federalism he has in mind works only for a “single”
populous.11 Federalism can defuse “identity-based differences” that,
unchecked, would have disparate populations killing each other.12 But Greve
insists that “one cannot understand American federalism unless one
understands the Founders’ insistence that American federalism is not of that
kind.”13 He proposes, then, an affirmative account of federalism in this
country, an account that makes federalism something other than the necessary
evil it is everywhere else.14
Professor Greve devotes the lion’s share of his book to an attack on
American federalism as it has come to be understood and practiced since the
New Deal. This extant federalism is about the states as entities. In operation,
by Greve’s account, it fosters the development of state “cartels,” which
conspire with the national government to gouge the public.15 Greve argues,
instead, that federalism is or should be about individual citizens (and
businesses) and what they want, and should get, from a federal structure.16 The
answer, he insists, is competition among the several states for the allegiance
(and residence) of people and companies searching for the package of taxes,
regulations, and services they find most attractive.17 According to Greve, this
9

Id. at 118.
Id. at 16.
11 GREVE, supra note 1, at 6.
12 Id. at 404 n.11.
13 Id.
14 I understand Greve to be concerned with the United States exclusively. Hence his
extensive treatment of the U.S. Constitution. Since his argument is largely economic,
however, he may think that it has, or would have, more general explanatory power. If so, he
neither states nor elaborates that contention in this book. Cf. id. at 329-30 (suggesting that
federalism in countries such as Argentina and Germany may be impervious to change).
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 6-7. Greve would acknowledge that he is not the first to argue that federalism is
primarily about competition among the states. He begins his own discussion with “Tiebout
10
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competitive federalism is revealed not only in modern economic analysis, but
also in a host of historical writings about the Constitution, most prominently
the Federalist.18
This sketch grossly oversimplifies Professor Greve’s argument. At any rate
there is much more detail in his massive book. If I can hope to contribute
meaningfully to this Symposium, I should leave off any further attempt to
summarize and move on to my questions.
III.
A.
My first question is whether competitive federalism puts a structural face on
what is at bottom a libertarian idea of acceptable government. I do not charge
Professor Greve with hiding an ideological theory behind a federalism façade.
He is forthright about his personal views and goes so far as to say that
governmental life in the Gilded Age was about as good as it gets.19 Greve does
not propose to revive the Old Court’s formalism for its own part.20 He
advocates what he thinks is an objectively defensible account of federalism
that, for him, happily comports with his own predilections. Still, I do wonder
whether the libertarian spirit is not evident in the premises from which he
works.
Greve begins with an imaginary original position in which individuals
choose the government they want before they know what place they will have
in society.21 He readily acknowledges that, given a choice, most people would
not select federalism in any form.22 Assuming, though, that only federalism is
on the menu, the question is what kind of federalism individuals would

competition,” and cites numerous entries in the fiscal federalism literature. Id. at 7 (citing
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)).
18 Id. at 45-62.
19 Id. at 5, 125. By contrast, Greve associates the federalism he thinks we actually have
(and he condemns) with unsustainable individual entitlements that, in his view, are due for a
“fiscal reckoning” with which conventional federalism is unequipped to deal. Id. at 382-83.
20 According to Greve, the Justices who controlled the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century did not mean to foster competition among the states, but nonetheless
developed doctrines that promoted competitive federalism just the same. Id. at 173-74.
21 Id. at 23. In this, he leans on the distinction between “precommitments” and “inperiod” positions developed by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. Id. (citing JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962)).
22 Id. at 45, 50 (acknowledging that Madison and Hamilton would have abolished the
states if it had been politically possible). Greve concedes that any governmental structure
that did not include the existing states was infeasible. Even if the men who drafted and
ratified the Constitution had wanted to jettison the states (and some plainly did), they could
not have done so. Id. at 5-6.
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choose.23 Greve assumes that everyone would see clearly that safety comes
first.24 It follows that all would accede to government a monopoly on physical
force.25 Beyond that, everyone would agree that “some desirable goods”
cannot be generated privately.26 Accordingly, “preconstitutional individuals”
would consent that government should be empowered to “force” some
exchanges.27 But only on two conditions – “acceptable decision costs” and
“adequate safeguards” against “abuse.”28 Summarizing, Greve asserts, “the
constitutional task is to craft rules that will permit Leviathan to command
Pareto-efficient exchanges while limiting, so far as possible, forced exchanges
beyond that point.”29
In these passages, Greve appears to say that, ex ante, individuals would
agree only to governmental distributions that are efficient in the classic Pareto
sense that no one receives a benefit at the expense of another. This, of course,
would entail minimalist government that would have troubled Herbert Spencer.
Pareto efficiency may be a useful idea in economic analysis; at least, it
supplies a label for a category of activity that economists may want to
recognize. But few of us would elide Pareto efficiency with justice. An
allocation in which one lucky participant has all the toys and his or her unlucky
chum has none is Pareto-efficient. Any further distribution must take from the
one and give to the other.30
Relatedly (I think), Professor Greve has it that individuals behind the veil
would choose competitive federalism, because it promises to “curb
government surplus.”31 Others have observed that the idea of state “surplus” is
both central to Greve’s thinking and surprisingly elusive.32 At times, Greve
uses “surplus” in a noncontroversial way to describe the diversion of tax
revenues from proper uses and into the pockets of politicians and their
friends.33 On other occasions, he uses the same “surplus” term to mean
exactions from out-of-state interests turned to the benefit of the resident

23

Id. at 19.
Id. at 37.
25 In the case of a potential attack from the outside, as I understand him, Greve thinks
that everyone would agree that the national government should have primary authority and
responsibility. Id. at 37.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 59-60 (1971).
31 GREVE, supra note 1, at 44.
32 R. Shep Melnick, Book Review, 11 FORUM 77, 87 (2013) (reviewing GREVE, supra
note 1); Jack M. Balkin, The Concept of “Surplus” in The Upside-Down Constitution,
BALKINIZATION (June 17, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-conceptof-surplus-in-upside-down.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D4LA-4NPL.
33 GREVE, supra note 1, at 13.
24
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population.34 This second form of “surplus” is connected to competitive
federalism in that cross-border taxation and regulation undermines the ability
of mobile individuals and companies to avoid unfavorable treatment by
migrating to more sympathetic jurisdictions.35 Yet it is often difficult to tell
whether government impositions fall, or are meant to fall, on outsiders. What
appear to be extraterritorial taxes and regulation bleed into the run of
governmental actions affecting local interests – actions that do not undercut the
ability of individuals and companies to “vote with their feet,”36 but rather
establish the basis for choices about where to locate.37 Better said, perhaps, in
this age there really is no helpful distinction between out-of-state and in-state
activities.
In still other instances, Professor Greve has it that government accumulates
“surplus” whenever it taxes or regulates in a way that serves the interests of
political favorites.38 This last kind of “surplus” is the stock and trade of
ordinary politics.39 To label political deal-making as exacting “surplus” is to
condemn virtually anything government does. It is hard to credit lumping so
many governmental activities together under the roof of “surplus” – everything
from padding official expense accounts to building a public school that
educators, parents, and taxpayers enthusiastically support, along with the
contractors who lobbied for it and stand to make money on the job.40 Greve
appears to recognize where his account of “surplus” leads – namely to the
denunciation of governmental action of any kind short of supplying police and
fire protection and the occasional lighthouse.
Which brings us back to my question. If competitive federalism is a good
idea because it largely limits government to Pareto-efficient distributions, and
because it eliminates or reduces state “surplus” defined to cover most taxation
and regulation, is competitive federalism the main event at all? Could
Professor Greve just as easily, more easily, argue that the best state is a
nightwatchman state without getting into intergovernmental structure?41 The
response cannot be that competitive federalism is the instrument by which

34

Id. at 7.
Melnick, supra note 32, at 88.
36 GREVE, supra note 1, at 7.
37 Id. at 89.
38 GREVE, supra note 1, at 100-01.
39 Melnick, supra note 32, at 89 (discussing the problems of characterizing “surplus” as
“naked interest group transfers”); Balkin, supra note 32 (characterizing this form of surplus
as “constituent surplus”).
40 See Balkin, supra note 32.
41 When Greve addresses tax policy deeper into the book, he claims that the Constitution
contemplates a “minimalist system,” which “holds out the prospect of robust tax
competition, both vertically (where states and the federal government compete for the same
tax base) and horizontally among states (where factor mobility limits the states’
appropriable surplus).” GREVE, supra note 1, at 81.
35
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good government, that is, minimal government, is achieved. We would first
have to agree that minimal government is something we ought to organize
government for. We do not.
B.
My second question is whether competitive federalism owes much to the
document we customarily call the Constitution, its text and its history (as best
we can discover it). Professor Greve explains at the outset that the point of his
book is to elucidate “the Constitution’s competitive structure and logic.”42 Yet
he disclaims public-meaning originalism and its “narrowly textual, clausebound exegesis” as “problematic and incomplete.”43 He contends that the
“principles and premises” that make sense of the Constitution “cannot be found
in” the document, but rather in “antecedent” ideas the Constitution does not
establish but presupposes.44
I do not understand Greve to be saying the obvious – that neither the term
“federalism” nor any explicit articulation of federal structure appears in the
text of the 1789 document and that, accordingly, federalism of any ilk can at
most be an inference from the text. He makes that point, to be sure.45 But he
means something far more important – namely, that a particular kind of
federalism, the competitive kind, is analytically prior to the text. Greve derives
competitive federalism independently as the form of federalism that
“preconstitutional” individuals would choose for themselves.46
Then again, Professor Greve contends that the “calculus” of the Constitution
“conforms elegantly” to the competitive federalism model.47 This, as I
understand it, is a move familiar in legal academic circles. Greve does not
propose to milk an idea from the text. He identifies an “economic federalism
theory” and “brings [it] to bear on the text.”48 He purports to arrive at the
correct account of the text by introducing independent ideas that make sense of
it. I hasten to clarify that Greve eschews any Dworkinan attempt to make of the
Constitution the best it can be.49 Rather, he presents competition as an essential
“constitutional principle and ‘tacit postulate’” that gets the Constitution right,50

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 5.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 2, 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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that is, an idea that genuinely explains the Constitution’s “architecture”51 and
“logic.”52
I have no objection to losing the notoriously flawed notion that
constitutional reasoning is an exercise in grammar. The Supreme Court itself
drops that pretense in many of its most important and controversial decisions.53
Nor do I protest references to external values as part of a pragmatic effort to
make peace with the text, which may be all that Greve proposes to do.54 Again,
most of us do the same thing all the time. Whether Greve is right that
competitive federalism can fill this bill is, of course, something else again. The
form his argument takes is noncontroversial; its strength is a matter of
judgment for the rest of us.
Professor Greve also, and again explicitly, disclaims any purpose to recover
the intentions of the men who drew up the documentary Constitution and
ratified it into law. He acknowledges that competitive federalism was “never
explicitly articulated by the Founders,” and, indeed, states flatly that his book
introduces “insights and empirical experiences that were not within the
Founders’ specific contemplation.”55 He cautions against “[projecting]
modern-day economic and public choice theories . . . backwards” to historical
individuals who plainly had nothing of the sort in mind.56 So far, so good.
Intentionalism is no longer respectable even among die-hard originalists – for
the many reasons laid out in an extensive literature.57
On this front, however, I wonder whether Greve does not stray from a sound
beginning as he goes along. In fairly short order, he insists that the “Founders”
did “perceive[]” the competitive features of federalism, albeit “imperfectly,”
and he ascribes to them insights going beyond their conscious understanding at
the time.58 He claims that Federalist 10 offered an “ingenious theory”
consistent with competitive federalism, despite Madison’s personal objection
to federalism of any kind.59 Indeed, he spends a great deal of time and space
locating competitive federalism in the Federalist generally.60 I do not think
Greve means that “the Founders” stumbled over competitive federalism in the

51

Id. at 58.
Id.
53 Greve cites the cases on state sovereign immunity as clear examples. Id. at 312-13. But
all the decisions having to do with constitutional structure, that is, the decisions in which
Greve is most interested, rest at most on values the Court ascribes to the Constitution
without specific textual warrant.
54 Id. at 390.
55 Id. at 16, 56, 63.
56 Id. at 7.
57 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE
BASIC QUESTIONS 81 (2007).
58 GREVE, supra note 1, at 17.
59 Id. at 39.
60 E.g., id. at 47-49.
52
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dark and made it the foundation of the Constitution by accident.61 Even as he
insists they were not thinking about this kind of federalism, he wants still to
credit them with some undeveloped insight that they were adopting a
constitutional structure that depends deeply on competition among member
states.
Throughout the book, as Greve strives to bring competitive federalism to
bear on the Constitution, he rests on what he thinks “the Founders” were about.
So, for example, when he distinguishes divided societies in which federalism is
an acceptable expedient, he relies on “the Founders’ insistence” that American
federalism, properly understood, is different – meaning the good kind of
federalism he calls competitive.62 And in his critique of developments since the
New Deal, he argues that the federalism we in fact observe is a federalism “we
were never meant to have.”63 These statements are jarring next to Greve’s
admission that the men he calls “the Founders” lacked a firm commitment to
federalism of any stripe.64
Perhaps I am making too much of the occasional turn of phrase. Given
Greve’s explicit disclaimers, it is hard to think that he does, after all, propose
to retrieve and rest on original intentions.65 It is vitally important, though, to
get this straight. We need to know if Greve contends that we are bound to
embrace competitive federalism whether we like it or not, because “the
Founders” thought it was a good idea and only their intentions count.
I rather think that Professor Greve means only to fortify his own argument
for competitive federalism by associating it with rough ideas held by strongminded men a long time ago. He links his argument to the historical
Constitution and its “Founders” only in the weak sense that competitive
federalism, independently arrived at, can be reconciled with at least some of
what was written and perhaps thought in 1789.66 This, again, is common fare
in legal academics, and I would be the last person to say the form of this
argument is objectionable. Then again, if this is the way Greve ties competitive
federalism to the documentary Constitution and its history, we are back to the
previous point. If Greve contends that we should now impose competitive

61

But see Ilya Somin, Turning Federalism Right-Side up, 82 CONST. COMMENT. 303, 321
(2012) (reviewing GREVE, supra note 1) (suggesting that “the Founders were organizing a
regime of competitive federalism without knowing it”).
62 GREVE, supra note 1, at 404 n.11 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 56. The Supreme Court notoriously tries to have intentionalist originalism both
ways. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), for example, the Court conceded that there is
no evidence that anyone in Philadelphia or at the ratifying conventions proposed that the
Constitution would immunize states from suit in their own courts, but still insisted that the
expectation that the Constitution would accord states immunity can be inferred from silence.
Id. at 741.
65 GREVE, supra note 1, at 14.
66 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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federalism on the Constitution, he needs a convincing case that we should
think this is a good idea in the here and now. And if his reason is that
competitive federalism generates Social Darwinism, he will not have many
adherents.
C.
My third question is whether competitive federalism comports with
democracy. On one level, of course, it plainly does not, cannot, and need not.
Anything that exists by virtue of a judicially enforced Constitution is, to that
extent, antidemocratic in the obvious sense that a higher law that trumps
majoritarian choices necessarily must be. Professor Greve, however, seems
affirmatively to celebrate overrides of democratic choices. One might say,
indeed, that democracy is the villain of his piece.
In the abstract, Greve allows that democracy is the “safest form of
government.”67 I take this to mean not that democracy is genuinely good, but
rather (with Churchill) that democracy is actually bad, only better than the
alternatives. In the next breath, Greve decries democratic government as
“dangerous” inasmuch as it enables “rapacious majorit[ies].”68 The “constant
challenge” to the competitive federalism he champions is “populist passion,”69
which, in his view, entails “interest group politics.”70
The federalism we actually have, in Greve’s view to our misfortune, has
come in response to “democratic demands.”71 This “cartel” federalism
emerged with the New Deal, which itself was the product of an “unusually
high political consensus” during the Great Depression.72 Back then, according
to Greve, the idea was to achieve a “more ‘democratic’ Constitution.”73 The
federalism that followed was “more open to the demands of distributional
coalitions and progressive social movements.”74 The result, in Greve’s telling,
has been “opportunistic interest group bargains”75 congealing in social policies
having a “very social-democratic feel.”76
Greve thinks that, “ideally,” the rules for our structural arrangements should
be “self-enforcing.”77 But competitive federalism is not a machine that would

67

GREVE, supra note 1, at 38.
Id.
69 Id. at 42.
70 Id. at 37.
71 Id. at 178.
72 Id. at 9.
73 Id. at 181.
74 Id. at 329.
75 Id. at 327.
76 Id. at 36. According to Greve, it is unrealistic to think we might retrieve a “pre-New
Deal Constitution” despite “democratic imperatives.” Id. at 386.
77 Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68
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go of itself. Given their head, Congress and the states will not preserve state
competition, but will, instead, cooperate with each other, thus to produce
“surplus.”78 Greve explains, then, that “[i]f competitive federalism is your cup
of tea, . . . you’ll want to entrust the federal structure principally to the
courts”79 – specifically “a federal judiciary armed to the teeth with
procompetitive federalism provisions”80 like the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Joinder Clause.81 It is in the enforcement of those provisions,
along with similar safeguards for competition fashioned judicially (like
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence) that the Supreme Court fulfills its
essential function to prevent the agents of government from discarding the
constitutionally ordained competitive structure.82 This, Greve contends, “is our
Founders’ constitutional arrangement.”83
In the event, Professor Greve argues that the Court has contrived to get its
role backward. Ever since Carolene Products,84 the Court has chosen to protect
individual constitutional rights and statutory “entitlements” created by
Congress and the states in response to democratic urges.85 His illustrations are
Roe v. Wade86 and various federal social welfare and education programs,
including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicare, and Medicaid.87
So far from a “rights” Court, however, Greve contends that the Constitution
demands a “structure” Court – one that enforces competition among the states
and leaves individual rights to “competitive politics” within the states.88
This is startling stuff. One would have thought – certainly I would have
thought – that the Carolene Products model is precisely right. Decisions made
by electorally accountable bodies are presumptively valid, and any judicial
trump must be justified by the necessity of protecting the democratic process
or individual rights from self-satisfied temporary majorities. Structural matters
can and should be left to develop as they will. Indeed, we should expect

78

Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
80 Id. at 78-79.
81 Id. at 69; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
82 GREVE, supra note 1, at 197; see id. at 111, 202 (acknowledging that the dormant
Commerce Clause lacks textual foundation). Greve contends that Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1
Pet.) 1 (1842), permitted corporations to use general law to thwart the accumulation of
surplus. GREVE, supra note 1, at 222. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
favors the plaintiff’s choice of state law and in that way prevents corporations from escaping
exploitation by repairing to the federal courts and more favorable general law. GREVE, supra
note 1, at 222.
83 GREVE, supra note 1, at 11.
84 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
85 GREVE, supra note 1, at 267.
86 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87 GREVE, supra note 1, at 267, 274-75 (discussing Roe v. Wade and federal programs).
88 Id. at 267-71.
79
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change in those quarters as the political world itself matures. One has to be
skeptical, then, about a structural idea that can be perpetuated only by main
force exerted by life-tenured judges.
Again, we are back to basics. Professor Greve promotes competitive
federalism as “the Founders’ constitutional arrangement,”89 albeit he denies
that “the Founders” actually thought things out in this way.90 If he contends
that, even so, competitive federalism is a constitutional mandate imposed upon
us by the men who wrote and ratified the 1789 document, then his case for
judicial enforcement in the teeth of democratic sentiment is intelligible.91
Intelligible, but scarcely persuasive. Most of us reject intentionalist originalism
out of hand. And if we bought into it at all, we would doubt the case for
originalist competitive federalism.
If, on the other hand, Greve does not propose that we are bound to embrace
competitive federalism on originalist grounds, then his argument for judicial
enforcement must rest on the premise that competition makes sense of the
Constitution, whatever the men responsible for it thought they were doing.
That claim, however, can be convincing only if we agree that there is great
value in competition among the states. Professor Greve thinks there is great
value in competition, but that may be only because he likes the results he
thinks enforcing competition will produce – namely, minimalist government at
all levels.92 I do wonder, again, whether this book is not in the end a lengthy
apologia for libertarian philosophy. If so, include me out.
D.
My next question is the extent to which competitive federalism recognizes
and perhaps promotes personal choices along noneconomic lines. As I read his
book, Professor Greve primarily argues that the mobility of capital and labor
encourages states to compete with one another for value-generating
commercial enterprise.93 Put the other way, companies are, or at least should
be, free to shift from jurisdiction to jurisdiction looking for the most
advantageous tax and regulatory environment for their businesses. Yet Greve
does not limit the reasons for relocating to the desire to make a buck, and I do
not understand him to be indifferent to individuals (and groups of individuals)
moving about in search of something else, something more personal. He says,
for example, that competitive federalism would “give states greater latitude in
regulating their own citizens’ mores.”94
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In a previous book, Greve was explicit that “the advantages of citizen choice
extend not only to economic matters but also, and with equal force, to social or
lifestyle issues.”95 He explained:
Some people do not wish to live near homosexual enclaves or in
jurisdictions that permit same-sex marriages; others like a tolerant,
bohemian environment. Some people (including some smokers) feel good
about themselves when banning smoking in public places; to others
(including some nonsmokers), such restrictions smack of creeping
fascism. Federalism permits the various constituencies to sort themselves
and go their separate ways.96
It may be that similar language appears in this new (big) book, and I have
overlooked it. Or perhaps this book merely emphasizes economic incentives.
At all events, I do wonder whether Greve is still committed to the idea that the
Constitution contemplates individual choices about where to live writ large.97 I
think so.
The idea that the states are to compete on noneconomic grounds is helpful to
Greve in one sense. It blunts the charge that competition for commercial
businesses systematically benefits states that tax and regulate least. Greve
thinks concerns about a “race to the bottom” are overdrawn.98 However that
may be in the case of competition for economic activity, one might say that
introducing competition for individuals making decisions on other grounds
renders Greve’s case easier. Corporations focused on their profit margin may
not care about personal and social affairs, but individuals do. And some at least
are mobile enough to act accordingly.
Competition for individuals pursuing ideologically comfortable
surroundings also responds to the suspicion that competitive federalism is
another name for minimalist government. According to Professor Greve, the
states should largely be allowed to regulate their own citizens as they please.
But, of course, citizens who object are free to depart, taking their productivity
with them.99 The market for citizens disciplines the states, discouraging
liberty-crushing regulation that drives too many residents to the exits, but also,
and this is the point, encouraging regulation that brings enough new shoppers

95 MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 4
(1999).
96 Id.
97 I should distinguish the familiar understanding that an individual’s entitlement to
change his or her state residency is not only grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but
readily inferable from the Constitution’s structure in the elementary sense that we have but
one nation. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
98 GREVE, supra note 1, at 186-88.
99 Id. at 7.
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in the door.100 Individual choice is a sorting mechanism, and everything comes
out in the wash.
If I understand correctly, Greve does not propose or predict that even perfect
state competition for individuals pursuing ideological ends would resolve itself
in some middle ground. It is not as though the states would all gravitate toward
the same mix of social policies, which, in turn, attracts the maximum number
of residents. This is the way political campaigns often work, but it is not what
Greve has in mind. Just as Greve disputes the “race to the bottom” thesis with
respect to competition for corporations, he would (I think) equally resist the
notion that competition for individuals will drive state regulation of personal
affairs to the lowest common denominator. Instead, he contends that
competition of this kind would produce and preserve a menu of opportunities
from which individuals can choose.101
State competition for residents making selections according to criteria like
these is unrealistic. The argument is too abstract. In my view, we have too
many states. We would need many, many more to make competition on this
scale feasible. And individuals would have to be far more mobile than they
actually are and, into the bargain, would have to be willing to participate in a
massive and never-ending game of musical chairs, always searching for a seat
that promises a marginally better approximation of personal ideals.
If we credit that some people would actually behave as Greve anticipates,
the implications are not pretty. Individuals end up locating where they
anticipate they themselves will not be pushed around, but where other people
will be. In Professor Greve’s earlier book, he suggested that state competition
benefits what Grover Norquist calls the “Leave-Us-Alone coalition,” which
Greve describes as “a conglomeration of . . . gun owners, school choice and
home schooling groups, the term limits movement, property rights groups,
religious advocacy and lay organizations, tax limitation groups, small business
owners, and so on.”102 Greve explains that these individuals and groups,
organized around ideas, are not uniformly libertarian.103 Many are not
demanding to be let alone at all; they are demanding that government impose
burdens on others. So, for example, individuals and groups may want
government to impose sectarian doctrine on the state’s population in the form
of limits on abortion or same-sex marriage, or they may want government to
tax the public to finance their parochial schools. I understand Greve to contend
that the states should be free to compete for residents on bases such as these.
To that extent, his competitive federalism is not libertarian philosophy by
another name. Far, very far, from it.
Professor Greve is clear that state competition of this kind is a two-way
street. If I were making my own selection – bear with me a moment – I would
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live where women can choose whether to bear children and where people can
marry anyone they love. While I am at it, I would find a place where SUVs,
smartphones, and leaf blowers are banned; where the wine shops are forbidden
to stock anything but cheap Australian reds; and where all watercraft must be
made of wood. Oh, and where no one would be allowed to possess a handgun,
but everyone would be obligated to have a King Charles spaniel.
Greve would leave individual constitutional rights to the states without any
meaningful, reassuring discipline. We conventionally do let states fashion a
wide variety of policies, subject only to the check that democracy provides.
But we do not, and should not, let states have their way with more personal
liberties the Constitution now protects. I have to live with noisy leaf blowers,
unless and until I can muster political support for a ban. But where choices
about child bearing and marriage are denied, individuals cannot simply be told
that’s the way we do things around here and, if you do not like it, take a hike.
If I have him right, Greve relies on politics in precisely the wrong place –
that is, where personal individual liberty requires protection from the majority.
With respect to ordinary economic and social welfare matters, however, he
discourages political participation and, instead, applauds poor sports who shirk
the responsibilities of self-government and simply pick up their marbles and
decamp. In his America, individuals exist in self-imposed bailiwicks of
bigotry, surrounded by companions who may as well be clones, isolated from
anyone who thinks differently. Greve’s America has no center at all, far less a
center that can hold. It is a nation of detached units. And it has no heart.
E.
My last question is whether competitive federalism supplies any answers to
the dysfunctions in the national government with which this Symposium is
concerned. Professor Greve contends for a brand of federalism that he thinks
benefits individuals and companies. He resists the federalism we actually have
in major part for centering on the states as entities. I wonder, though, whether
Greve’s focus on the horizontal relations among the states does not neglect the
role the states play as units in the makeup and operations of the national
government. If, for purposes of argument, we accepted that competitive
federalism promises the good results Greve identifies, might we still conclude
that those benefits are outweighed by the damage federalism does elsewhere in
the system?
Take the easiest example. As matters are now arranged constitutionally,
each state has two seats in the United States Senate. Consequently, sparsely
populated states to the west and south of here exert disproportionate political
power. Or, if you like, the resident majorities in those states have a greater
capacity to affect the Senate’s behavior than do majorities in eastern states
with large urban populations. At times, including this time, this undemocratic
structural design makes it difficult for the Senate as a whole to perform even
routine functions (like giving advice and consent regarding appointments).
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I dare say that some proponents of federalism do not view this state of
affairs with alarm: The states are supposed to check the national government
(thus to safeguard individual liberty), and this is only a graphic illustration of
the ways they do so. But I do not understand Professor Greve to take that
position. By his account, “the Founders” did not conceive that the states could
or would defend liberty against national governmental power104 and so
withheld from the states any means of resisting “federal aggression.”105 If I am
right about this, then, for Greve, the outsized power of small-population
western and southern states in the Senate should be an invitation to demand
abusive rents – the very thing competitive federalism was meant to forestall. I
do wonder, accordingly, whether Professor Greve would form common cause
with commentators who fault current arrangements for the states’ participation
in the national government.
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